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The Geographical Transformation of Arab Media: 
The Decline of Offshore Media and the Rise of the Media City
Chiba Yushi*
Abstract
This article aims to clarify the geographical transformation of Arab media and under-
stand contemporary Arab media dynamics with a focus on satellite channels.  After the 
1970s, many Arab media publishers, initially operating in Europe, became infl uential 
actors in the Arab media scene.  Since then, Europe has been regarded as a harbor for 
the freedom of speech.  These media with headquarters outside of the Arab world, 
mainly in Europe, are referred to as ‘offshore media.’  The offshore media phenomenon 
and its consequence, the geographical division of Arab media discourse between the 
Arab world and Europe, were regarded as an essential characteristic of Arab media.  
However, after the mid-1990s, the development and proliferation of satellite television 
prompted the return of Europe-based Arab media companies, particularly satellite chan-
nels, to Arab countries, and this geographical division was dissolved.  Now, most of 
the pivotal Arab satellite channels broadcast not from Europe but from within the Arab 
world.  Importantly, in accommodating these previously Europe-based media channels 
(and a number of newcomers), a phenomenon called the ‘media city’ has played an 
important role.  Some consider these media cities as the new harbors for freedom of 
speech, an alternative to the role previously played by Europe.  This article will trace 
the geographical transformation of Arab media historically, with particular focus on 
the decline of offshore media and the rise of the media cities.  Furthermore, through the 
analysis of three media cities in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, this article will suggest 
that the media city can function not only as a substitute for Europe, but also as a key 
device for promoting and maintaining the diversity and multiplicity of contemporary 
Arab media.
1. Introduction
1.1 The Geographical Characteristics of Arab Media
A signifi cant development in Arab media during the 1990s, according to former American diplomat 
and leading Arab media scholar William Rugh, was the ‘growth of newspapers and broadcasting 
stations that have their main editorial offi ces outside of the Arab world but at the same time consider 
their target audiences as being within the Arab world’ [Rugh 2004: 167].  During the 1970s, some 
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Arab publishers that aimed to attract readers from all over the Arab world took refuge in Europe 
from their politically-unstable regions and authoritarian regimes oppressive to freedom of speech. 
They published papers in Arabic, the lingua franca, which disseminated their thoughts to the Arab 
world.  Media headquartered outside the Arab world, mainly in Europe, were named ‘offshore 
media.’  As these offshore media fl ourished during the 1970s and 1980s, capitals such as London 
and Paris came to be seen as harbors for freedom of speech.  Therefore, not only publishers but also 
private Arab broadcasting companies started businesses in Europe.  By the mid-1990s, those Europe-
based media companies came to occupy a considerable presence in both the print and broadcast 
media [Sakr 2001; Rugh 2004; Rinnawi 2006; Lynch 2006; Kraidy and Khalil 2009].  The locale of 
Arab media discourse was geographically divided between Europe and the Arab world, and the ex-
tent of freedom-of-speech available to private Europe-based media over national Arab-based media 
had been expanded. 1)  As a result, this geographical division of Arab media discourse is considered to 
be a typical characteristic of Arab media.
However, during the 2000s, many Europe-based Arab media companies, particularly satellite 
channels, moved their headquarters to the Arab world and began operating there.  Although some 
private presses stayed in Europe, most of them believe that the advantages of operating in Europe 
have disappeared [Jarrah 2008].  A number of media newcomers, particularly satellite channels, have 
started operating inside the Arab world.  As a result, the presence of offshore media has declined, 
and the geographical division of Arab media discourse, once thought typical of Arab media, has 
dissolved, and is not considered typical any longer.  This being the case, what has dissolved the 
geographical division between the Arab world and Europe?  Where did previously European-based 
Arab media establish themselves?  How was the situation of Arab media transformed?
To answer these questions, this paper considers two issues.  First, the geographical transforma-
tion of Arab media is considered with a sharp focus on satellite channels, which have been highly 
infl uential on contemporary Arab society, and which spurred the decline of offshore media and thus 
dissolved the geographical division of Arab media discourse.  Second, to analyze the situation after 
Europe-based satellite companies had come back to the Arab world, this article focuses on the ‘media 
city,’ considered the new harbor for freedom of speech.  Thus, this article will examine the develop-
ment and function of the media city in the contemporary Arab media scene.
 1) Most media companies located outside Arab countries have generally tried to secure pan-Arab audiences when 
targeting the Arab market.  In contrast, media companies that locate their headquarters within the Arab world 
usually target local audiences.
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1.2 Conceptual Framework and Research Methods
For a systematic analysis of these issues, the theory of international communication studies is useful. 
According to Sinclair et al. [1996], understanding the dynamics occurring in the international 
media scene after the mid-1980s requires an analysis of the ‘geolinguistic region,’ defi ned as a region 
whose residents share a language.  They consider geolinguistic regions to be ‘imagined communities 
of speakers of the same language and participants in similar cultures which form the geolinguistic 
regions exploited by the media entrepreneurs, especially the diasporic communities of émigrées on 
distant continents’ [Sinclair et al. 1996: 25].
Turning our eyes to Arab media studies, since the 1990s, many scholars have been working 
to reveal the characteristics of the Arabic geolinguistic region that has been created by new media 
technologies such as satellite television and the internet.  In the book Instant Nationalism, Khalil 
Rinnawi argues that the penetration of satellite television into Arab societies has created a shared 
sense of Arab nationalism, which he calls ‘McArabism’ [Rinnawi 2006: xiii], a term inspired by 
Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld [Barber 1995].  Rinnawi considers this process the outcome 
of satellite technology and a confrontation between localism and globalization.  He argues about 
the viewing of satellite television that, ‘when the television is turned off, Arab citizens return to their 
respective local lives and specifi c realities’ [Rinnawi 2006: xiii].  To describe the formation and 
meaning of McArabism, he emphasizes the structure of what he calls the ‘Arab media environment.’ 
In order to reveal its structural formation, he describes the history of Arab media from the mid-
twentieth century, when the mass media fi rst penetrated the Arab world.  Although he provides a 
full description of satellite television, he unfortunately doesn’t spend much time discussing the media 
cities, which are considered to have been fundamental to the reshaping of the contemporary Arab 
media scene.
Speaking of the geolinguistic region created by broadcast media, Tourya Guaaybess argues that 
‘national broadcasting landscapes’ transformed into an ‘Arab television landscape’ after the 1990s, 
mainly through the development of satellite technology [Guaaybess 2002].  Like many scholars, she 
also considers that the recent Arab media scene was reshaped by the appearance and development of 
satellite television, which infused fi erce competition into a previously static market.  She proposes, 
therefore, that it is helpful to consider recent developments from two perspectives: ‘sky-competition’ 
and ‘ground-competition’ [Guaaybess 2005: 226, 2011].  The former term refers to the satellite 
realm: satellite television rapidly intensifi ed its presence in the Arab world immediately after it fi rst 
appeared, generating fi erce competition between satellite and terrestrial channels, and between 
national and private channels.  Now, satellite television is a cutting-edge medium and has opened up 
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the contemporary Arab media scene.  At the same time, as Guaaybess says, sky-competition was a 
prelude to what she calls ground-competition.  Since the mid-1990s, privileged areas called ‘media 
cities’ 2) have been competing to host private media companies, particularly satellite channels.  In 
addition to countries such as Egypt, Jordan and the UAE that already have media cities, a number 
of other countries are also constructing them or planning to do so.  However, studies on the media 
city are scarce, and those pioneering studies on media cities that do exist tend to discuss each media 
city separately or compare their legal and economic aspects. 3)  Consequently, they do not inquire 
into the relationships between one media city and the other media cities, or between media cities and 
media companies, particularly satellite channels.  Therefore, the question underlying Guaaybess’ 
conception, how the sky and ground react to each other, has yet to be addressed.  In order to under-
stand the dynamics of the contemporary Arab media scene, we need to shed light on the role that 
contemporary media cities can play, and on the interaction between the media and their locations, 
thereby bringing new perspectives to contemporary Arab media dynamics.
This paper consists of fi ve sections including this introduction.  The historical formation and 
transformation of Arab media scene with particular focus on its geographical aspect are narrated 
in Section 2 and Section 3.  These chapters are based on the preceding research both in English 
and Arabic.  In Section 4, the development and relationships between three media cities in Egypt, 
Jordan, and the UAE are discussed.  To describe the latest situation of media cities, I made several 
visits to media cities in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE in 2011. 4)  I also conducted several interviews 
with staff of media cities, and visited some TV companies located in the media cities.  Through these 
 2) Several names for this area exist: Krzysiek [2009] calls it a ‘free media zone,’ while others simply call it a ‘media 
city.’  I follow the latter.
 3) Some studies argue the launch and development of each media city separately.  For example, Schleifer [2000] and 
Sullivan [2001a] reported the launch and the prospect of a media city in Dubai, and el-Baltaji [2007] argues its 
development and the problems that it encounters after operating for several years.  Kraidy and Khalil [2009] must 
be the most recent study that mentions the media city.  However, their focus is also just Dubai’s case.  Also Kandil 
[2000], Forrester [2001] and Oaf [2006] argue the launch, development and prospect of a media city in Egypt.  In 
addition, Hamdy describes the tendency of tenant users in an Egyptian media city.  In 2001, fi rst media city ap-
peared in Jordan, and Sullivan [2001b] reported its launch.  Those studies don’t consider the relationship between 
one media city and the others.  Other studies do examine several media cities together.  For example, Quinn et 
al. [2004] discuss the economic aspects of media cities in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE.  And Krzysiek [2009] 
compares the legal aspects of existing media cities.  However, they don’t inquire into the relationship between 
them.  Guaaybess [2002] relates the potential of media cities to the Arab media industry.  However, no other study 
has followed the situation after 2002.
 4) The fi eld research in Egypt is from January 14th, 2011 to January 28th, 2011.  The research in Jordan is from Janu-
ary 28th, 2011 to February 7th, 2011, and from November 17th, 2011 to November 26th, 2011.  The fi eld research 
in Dubai is from February 7th, 2011 to February 12th, 2011, from February 17th, 2011 to February 21th, 2011, and 
from November 11th, 2011 to November 26th, 2011.
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fi eld researches, Section 4 describes the latest state of media cities and reveals the dynamics that 
contemporary media cities can create.  Finally in Section 5, the conclusion and outlook of future 
research is discussed.
2. Historical Overview
2.1 The Dawn of Pan-Arab Broadcasting
To understand the conditions that produced offshore media and spawned pan-Arab broadcasting, we 
must fi rst take a look at the state of the Arab world’s media in the mid-twentieth century.
As the lingua franca of the Arab world, Arabic has played a crucial role in conveying ideas and 
information throughout the region.  According to the defi nition by Hussein Amin, the ‘Arab world’ 
generally refers to the eighteen countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen [Amin 2001: 23].  These eighteen countries defi ne the Arabic language as 
their offi cial language and have had the advantage, particularly since the late nineteenth century, of 
being able to circulate information in a common tongue, thus creating a sense of unity in spite of the 
geographical distances that separate them.
For disseminating a message, some form of medium is essential.  Throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth century, the printing press was an important medium through which Arab elites and 
intellectuals exchanged knowledge and Egypt and Lebanon, as the main cultural suppliers, played 
central roles in this process.  This is clearly refl ected in the traditional saying, ‘Egypt writes, Lebanon 
prints, and Iraq reads.’  However, the Arab literacy rate has always been generally low and thus 
broadcasting has had more infl uence on the masses and a more profound impact on societies than 
the printing press.  Broadcast media such as radio and television should be the focus of any media 
analysis of the Arab world, and we should not overlook Egypt’s desire to be acknowledged as having 
hegemony over the Arab broadcasting arena.
Radio, the fi rst broadcasting medium, appeared in the Arab world in 1925, 5) but its widespread 
use and expansion started after 1952, when the Egyptian Free Offi cers Movement overthrew the 
ancien régime and began propagating their revolutionary message inside and outside Egypt.  Nasser 
(Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir) utilized the radio for this effort and thereby promoted its expansion.  The most 
famous radio service was the ‘Voice of the Arabs,’ which Nasser used for his own political purposes. 
The Voice of the Arabs started on the July 4th, 1953 as a 30-minute program on Radio Cairo. 
 5) According to ‘Abd, A. [2008: 41-43], the exact date of radio’s inception differs among scholars.  I followed the date 
mentioned by ‘Abd, A. and N. ‘Abd [2008: 14].
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Although the program expanded rapidly soon after its launch and became independent, it was 
designed to appeal not only to the Egyptians but to all the other Arabs as well.  On this point, James 
[2006] observes that, just a month and a half after its launch, the program was already protesting 
the French authorities’ deportation of the Moroccan sultan.  Appealing to the Arab masses through 
these broadcasts was Nasser’s way of taking the initiative in Arab affairs.  Nasser also used the Voice 
of the Arabs to criticize Arab governments that were critical of Egypt and give the anti-establishment 
fi gures of other Arab states the opportunity to criticize their governments [Kosugi 2006: 338-341].
The Voice of the Arabs was the Arab world’s most widely listened to radio service of the 1950s 
and 1960s: it was particularly popular in Egypt and the Mashriq countries. 6)  Arabs listened to the 
airwaves coming from Egypt because of its cultural supremacy in the Arab world. 7)  Thus, many 
Arabs listened to the Egyptian radio service even though it was sometimes seen as propagandistic. 
Whether effective or not, the popularity of the Voice of the Arabs is frequently cited as evidence of 
Egypt’s supremacy in the Arab broadcasting scene of the 1950s and 1960s.  A sense of rivalry and 
the wish to shield their citizens against Egyptian radio services became the driving forces that made 
other Arab states, particularly the Gulf states, developed their own broadcasting capacities [Chiba 
2012a: 122-123].
2.2 The Era of Informational Independence
However, after the 1967 Arab-Israel War the Arab media situation suddenly changed.  During the 
war, the Voice of the Arabs deliberately delivered false news, and the Egyptian radio services lost 
their credibility after the Arab’s defeat.  Since the decline of Egyptian radio, as Lynch [2006: 36] 
states, ‘despite many efforts nobody—certainly not Saddam Hussein—has successfully recaptured 
Nasser’s mantle.’  The defeat of 1967 damaged the dream of Egyptian leadership, and though leaders 
such as Qaddafi , Assad, and Saddam wished to rule the next ‘Arab Prussia,’ in Sivan’s words [Sivan 
1997: 207], nobody succeeded or created an infl uential radio service equivalent to the Voice of the 
Arabs.
While Egypt still exercised a strong infl uence upon other Arab countries even after the 1970s 
through cultural exports such as dramas, and fi lms, many Arab states began to strengthen their own 
 6) Although it is quite diffi cult to fi nd empirical statistics on the size of the service’s audience or its degree of infl uence 
(because little pan-Arabic research occurred in this period), we can infer its strong infl uence from audience research 
done in the mid-1970s showing that nearly one fi fth of the people in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan 
were listening to the Voice of the Arabs more than once a week [Rugh 1987: 151; Boyd 1999: 22].
 7) A long time after the Arab Renaissance at the end of the nineteenth century, talented celebrities such as Umm al-
Kulthūm and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb along with skilled electronic technicians, had been producing attractive 
radio programs that permeated the whole Arab world.
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broadcasting capacities by developing their equipment and establishing information agencies.  The 
development of national news agencies and the impact of television were particularly important. 
By 1970, most Arab states had started their own television services or had nationalized previously 
foreign and privately owned television services.  Other states, some of the Gulf states, had also 
nationalized their broadcast and news agencies by the mid-1970s.  In general, many Arab countries 
were ready to control their information fl ows by the mid-1970s.
Television permeated into Arab society during the 1970s and 1980s, and together with radio 
became the main media in Arabs’ daily lives.  Because of its visual nature, television appealed to 
the masses, who quickly became accustomed to it.  However, the range of television was confi ned 
within national borders and only touched adjacent parts of neighboring countries, so the more Arabs 
became accustomed to watching television throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the more they became 
accustomed to getting their information from a national source.  Therefore, the national diffusion of 
television generally contributed to the sustenance of ‘closed regimes’ [Rinnawi 2006: 30-34].
This inward-looking media tendency was exacerbated by the failure of cooperative organization 
among Arab countries.  In the 1970s, Arab states entered into a partnership to establish collaborative 
news agencies and information organizations in the spirit of international movements, such as New 
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), who called for the closure of information 
gaps between developed and developing countries. 8)  However, virtually all attempts failed or mal-
functioned for nearly two decades, mainly because of the discord among the respective nations.  Even 
though some leading fi gures, such as Mustafa Masmoudi, former Tunisian Minster of Information, 
contributed to the drafting of UNESCO’s Mass Media Declaration, the situation deteriorated with 
most Arab states postponing the establishment of regional information agencies and strengthening 
national media boundaries [Chiba 2012a: 128].
2.3 The Advent of Offshore Media
The Arab media environment became insular and led to the oppression of freedom of speech during 
the 1970s.  At the same time, changes in the regional, political, and economic situation gave birth to 
offshore media that were ‘produced by Arabs, for Arabs, in Arabic, with Arab agendas and attitudes, 
but outside the stifl ing confi nes of the Arab states’ [Jarrah 2008].  The 1970s saw the appearance of 
pan-Arab presses, most of them edited and headquartered in Europe.  The pan-Arab presses not only 
contributed to reshaping the pan-Arab media environment of the time but also affected the Arabic 
 8) The collaboration led to the establishment of Maghrebvision in 1970, Gulvision in 1977, the Arab States 
Broadcasting Union (ASBU) in 1969, and the Arab Satellite Organization (ARABSAT) in 1976.  For details on 
Maghrebvision, see [al-Shāl 1993].
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broadcasting structure of the 1990s, typifi ed by satellite television.  In considering the trajectory of 
the Arabic broadcasting scene, the pan-Arab presses should be discussed.
The birth of the pan-Arab presses had two main geopolitical causes: the inner confl ict in 
Lebanon starting in 1975, and the prosperity of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and their 
increasing investments.  The Lebanese confl ict forced journalists to fl ee from Lebanon to European 
refuges, particularly London and Paris.  The Gulf states have provided fi nancial subsidies to offshore 
media companies, who hired journalists from areas such as Lebanon and Palestine. 9)  As a result, 
many Arab publishing companies appeared in the 1970s, particularly in London.  In 1977, the 
Saudi Research and Marketing Group began publishing al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ paper from London and 
distributed it to Arab countries through satellite technology.  More dailies, such as al-‘Arab and al-
Zamān, were published in 1978.  Famous pan-Arab dailies, such as al-Ḥayāt and al-Quds al-‘Arabī, 
also began publishing from London [Rugh 2004: 173; Rinnawi 2006: 35].  In addition to dailies, 
weeklies and magazines were also published there.  Although several reasons can be provided as to 
why so many Arab publishers established their headquarters in London, factors such as editorial 
freedom, qualitative edge, and the existence of a number of people of Arab origin with a Western 
university education can be considered the most important. 10)  Even though Saudi Arabia held 
infl uence over many of them through the investors with close relationships to the Saudi royal family, 
the benefi ts of publishing outside the Arab world exceeded the disadvantages of publishing inside 
it.  Basically ‘[i]t was the quest for political infl uence rather than commercial profi t that was the 
principal driving force behind the expansion of the offshore Arab media’ [Jarrah 2008].
3. Trajectory of Offshore Media
3.1 Satellite Television and the Lasting Geographical Division
The fi rst proposal to launch media satellites occurred in 1967, when it was agreed to establish an 
organization to govern satellite broadcasting at a meeting of Arab information ministers in Tunisia. 
However, because of internal political tensions, the fi rst satellites, the ARABSAT 1A and 1B, were 
not launched for another two decades and remained unused for fi ve years.  In 1990, the Egyptian 
government launched its fi rst satellite channel, the Egypt Space Channel (ESC).  The purpose of the 
ESC was to broadcast programs to Egyptian military personnel dispatched in Kuwait during the Gulf 
 9) Moreover, some prominent Lebanese journalists have set up their newspapers in Europe and have been afterward 
fi nanced by petrodollars.
10)  For example, Arab journalists such as Jihād Khājin, a famous columnist for some London-based pan-Arab papers 
such as al-Ḥayāt, started his career as a reporter at Reuters and then moved to Arab media [Kraidy 2010: 74].  This 
is one example of the recruitment of an Arab journalist by a London-based Arab publisher.
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War.  Compared with terrestrial channels whose coverage was limited to within national borders 
and parts of adjacent countries, satellite channels are characterized by their widespread transmission 
coverage and have eroded the earlier existing forms of television broadcasting.  Therefore, in the era 
of the satellite channel, every Arab regime is threatened by the loss of the informational sovereignty 
that it could previously exert.  Therefore, the setting up of ESC stimulated other countries to launch 
their own satellite channels. 11)  After the ESC, as for national satellite channels, the UAE began 
Emirates Dubai TV (EDTV) in 1992, and others followed. 12)  In addition, the Gulf War spurred an 
increase in private satellite channels, mostly owned by Saudi investors.  Saudis did not learn about 
the outbreak of the war until fi ve days after it had occurred because of a government enforced media 
blackout.  Word got out only because satellite television channels such as CNN were watched by 
wealthy Saudis. 13)  This incident, called the ‘CNN shock,’ made people aware of the importance of 
collecting information from outside their nation [Hosaka 2005: 62].
In the appearance of satellite channels in the Arab world, the lasting infl uence of the pan-Arab 
presses can be pointed out.  Unlike the national satellite channels, most private channels located their 
headquarters in the West, marking a clear geographical division between national satellite channels 
and private ones.  Most private channels preferred to locate their headquarters in London or Rome. 
Famous channels that started in London include the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), 
Showtime Arabia, and the Arab News Network (ANN).  Channels with Roman roots include Arab 
Radio and Television (ART), Orbit, and LBC-sat. 14)  Except for the ANN, owned by the estranged 
cousin of the Syrian president, most networks were owned by entrepreneurs with strong connections 
to the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia [Kraidy and Khalil 2009: 21].
In considering the geographical aspects, it is quite easy to see that the trajectory of the pan-Arab 
presses of the 1970s and 1980s was inherited by the early Arab satellite channels.  They hired many 
Arab journalists with European experience; in fact, many Arab satellite news channels owe much to 
the Europe-based pan-Arab presses.  The career dependency between the pan-Arab presses and the 
private satellite channels is obvious.  Like the pan-Arab presses, the Arab satellite channels, in their 
early stages, were typical offshore media.
11)  When ESC started, most of its programs were the same as those on Egypt’s terrestrial channels.
12)  Jordan began Jordan Satellite Broadcasting in 1992.  Egypt added one channel, Nile TV, in 1993.  Morocco began 
Radio Television du Maroc (RTM) in 1994.  Syria began Syrian Television (STV) in 1995.  By the mid-1990s, most 
Arab countries had their own satellite channels.
13)  CNN has been re-beamed by the terrestrial TV in Saudi Arabia and Egypt in 1991.
14)  The LBC’s satellite channel was offi cially launched in April 1996, transmitting from Italy tapes recorded in 
Lebanon [Kraidy and Khalil 2009: 21].
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3.2 The Decline of Offshore Media
However, this situation gradually changed after the mid-1990s.  Newly launched private channels 
started to locate their operations in Arab countries rather than Europe.  These channels included 
some Lebanese channels, such as Future TV, launched in 1996 and owned by the family of ex-prime 
minister Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī, and al-Manār TV, launched in 2000 and closely connected to Ḥizb Allāh. 
In Qatar, al-Jazeera TV, subsidized by the Amir of Qatar, started as an independent satellite channel. 
Thus, in most Arab countries, private satellite channels set up their operations from within Arab 
territories, not in Europe.  Many leading satellite channels after 1996, as shown in Table 1, started 
broadcasting from within Arab territories.
In addition to those newcomers, most of the Arabic satellite channels that had operated in 
Europe moved their headquarters to Arab countries.  In 2001, the MBC channel moved its head-
quarters from London to the UAE.  The ART channel and its offshoot the Iqra’ channel moved from 
Italy to Egypt in 2002, and then moved to Jordan in 2004.  In addition, Orbit, a leading satellite 
channel, also moved from Italy to Bahrain in 2005 [Kraidy and Khalil 2009: 21].  After returning 
to Arab countries, these channels began to create offshoot channels, which doubled the number of 
Arabic satellite channels.  Jordan, Egypt, and the UAE were the most popular broadcasting centers. 
As a result, the vast majority of the leading Arabic satellite channels now operate from within the 
Arab world rather than Europe.
Some private presses, such as al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, and al-Ḥayāt, are still edited in London. 
However, Jarrah [2008] observes that most of them no longer had a reason to continue operating in 
Europe and that remaining there is now only a matter of prestige. 15)  The few exceptional cases, such 
15)  In fact, al-Ḥayāt has offi ces in London, Frankfurt, Cairo, Bahrain, Beirut, New York, and other major cities.  In 
2002, al-Ḥayāt and LBC merged to establish their news department.
Table 1.  Selected Private Satellite Channels between 1996 and 2003
Inaugurated Year Name Country-Link Headquarter
1996 Future TV Lebanon Beirut
1996 al-Jazeera Qatar Doha
2000 al-Manar Lebanon Beirut
2000 NBN Lebanon Beirut
2001 Dream TV Egypt Cairo
2002 Zayn TV Lebanon Dubai
2002 al-Mihwar Egypt Cairo
2003 al-Arabiya Saudi Arabia Dubai
Sources: Rugh [2004]; Sakr [ 2001]
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as al-Quds al-‘Arabī, Mustaqilla TV, and al-Khalifa TV, show that Europe is still a harbor for free-
dom of speech. 16)  However, the power of this fact has lessened, and the presence of offshore media 
has accordingly declined.  It is not an overstatement to say that offshore media and the geographical 
division of Arab media discourse that had been regarded as the fundamental characteristics of Arab 
media are now almost extinguished.
3.3 Behind the Transformation
By the mid-1990s, it had become the dominant belief in the Arab world that locating outside the 
Arab world was a prerequisite for freedom of speech.  This belief was reinforced by the emigration of 
Lebanese media to Europe after the breakout of the Civil War in 1975.
What changed?  El-Oifi  attributes this change of belief to al-Jazeera:
Al-Jazeera has put an end to the perception that Arab media cannot thrive within the Arab 
world….  The example of Al-Jazeera shows that Arab media implemented in an Arab country can, 
in fact, have a larger margin of freedom.  As a consequence, Saudi media in Europe has gradually 
started to come back to the Middle East region [el-Oifi  2005: 71].
As he emphasizes, al-Jazeera has been the leading Arab media player and thus might have contrib-
uted to ending the predominant belief that Europe was the harbor for freedom of speech.  However, 
even if we admit the leading role of al-Jazeera at the cutting edge of the Arab information revolution, 
we cannot attribute everything to the success of that network.
Kraidy and Khalil [2009: 23] provide a more thorough explanation.  They point to four factors: 
the clashes between media practices following Saudi and British journalistic norms, 17) the high cost 
of operating in Europe, the wish to be closer to Arab audiences geographically and culturally, and 
the development of media cities in the Arab world that many Arab countries had started to construct 
in order to attract private media companies.  In addition to these, we could mention other reasons, 
such as amendments to the media laws in some Arab countries to allow private media companies 
to operate within their national borders, and the stabilization of Lebanon, which pulled Lebanese 
16)  Mustaqilla TV, a private Tunisian satellite network founded in 2000, operates in London.  Al-Khalifa TV, a private 
Algerian satellite network founded in 2002, operates in Paris [Rugh 2004: 219].  However, most pivotal satellite 
channels have already moved their headquarters to the Arab world.  Now, it is diffi cult to fi nd any pivotal satellite 
channels that locate their headquarters in the West.  Although some infl uential quality newspapers do headquarter 
in the West, Jarrah [2008] points out that those who still have headquarters in the West have lost the reason for 
being based there.  And if there is any reason, it is just “a matter of prestige” [Jarrah 2008].
17)  The plan to create the BBC Arabic services in collaboration with Orbit failed after the BBC broadcast a program 
entitled ‘Death of a Principle’ in spite of Orbit’s objections.
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media back to their homeland.  For example, Dream TV, the fi rst private channel in Egypt, appeared 
in 2001 soon after a declaration from the Egyptian Information Ministry that it would permit the 
licensing of private companies.  LBC-sat, initially registered in London, moved back to Lebanon in 
1996, soon after the civil war ended.
3.4 The Increase in Satellite Channels and the Intensifi cation of Economical Pressure
Although many interconnected factors are attributed to the geographical transformation of the con-
temporary Arab media scene, the political-economy approach requires us to analyze the economical 
aspect in particular.
A proliferation of television stations took place in the 2000s.  The launch of Egypt’s state-
owned Nilesat expanded transponder capacity and lowered the rent for each one.  With the entrance 
barrier thus lowered, Arab satellite channels proliferated.  With the launch of Nilesat 101 in 1998 
and Nilesat 102 in 2000, the two satellites’ total capacity reached nearly 230 digital channels [Sakr 
2007: 7], and the lower rent for transponders prompted entrepreneurs to enter the media business. 
Subsequently other satellites were launched which furthered the proliferation of satellite channels. 
Backed by the world’s largest growth in satellite viewership, the number of satellite channels 
increased dramatically, as Fig. 1 shows.  A study shows that the number of satellite channels reached 
450 by January 2009 and is still increasing.
The dramatic increase in satellite channels intensifi ed the economic situation surrounding Arab 
media.  This economic pressure triggered the structural transformation of Arab media and prompted 
many Europe-based Arab satellite companies to go back to their homelands.  For instance, ART an-
nounced in 2004 that it expected to reduce its operating costs by nearly 60% after moving to Jordan 
from Italy [Sakr 2007: 237; Jordan Times, September 10, 2004].  In 2005, Orbit moved to Bahrain 
because it was unhappy with the tax arrangements in Rome [Sakr 2007: 196].  In addition to those 
channels, Steven Clark, MBC News Director, said that it would ‘be more economic to run operations 
from there [Dubai] than from here [London]’ [Sullivan 2001a].
Fig. 1.  The Increasing Number of Satellite Channels in the Arab World
Source: Dubai Press Club [2010]
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However, even given this return to the Arab world, questions remain.  Where, precisely, did they 
go?  Where did the channels relocate their offi ces?  To answer these questions, let us now consider 
the media city, regarded by some to be the new harbor for freedom of speech and thus an attractive 
location for contemporary Arab satellite channels.
4. The Media City and Its Meaning
4.1 The Development of the Media City
Since the 1990s, some Arab countries have constructed special economic zones within their borders 
to invite foreign companies to invest and set up industries in their countries.  A ‘media city’ is 
one such economic zone that aims to attract non-governmental media companies.  It is generally 
characterized by attractive advantages such as tax-exemptions, an offer of 100% foreign ownership, 
modern infrastructures, special laws, and limited intervention from governments.  In accommodat-
ing the previously Europe-based media companies and a number of newcomers, the media cities have 
played an important role.  Now, most famous private companies on the contemporary Arab media 
scene have their headquarters and bureaus located in one of these media cities.
Pioneering attempts to offer attractive locations for media companies were made as early as the 
1970s. 18)  However, media cities for satellite channels really took shape in the mid-1990s.  The fi rst 
media city, Egyptian Media Production City (EMPC), was inaugurated with much fanfare in 1997. 
This inspired the establishment of other media cities, such as Dubai Media City (DMC) and Jordan 
Media City (JMC).  As a result, the idea of the media city became widespread, spurring the establish-
ment of media cities in other Arab countries.  By 2009, in addition to the existing eight media cities 
in Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and the UAE, plans to set up media cities were in progress in Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan 19) [Arab Advisors Group, November 1, 
2009].  The ownership of existing media cities can be categorized into three types according to their 
shareholdings: government ownership, private ownership, and semi-government ownership.  In addi-
tion to governmental and private efforts, political groups such as Ḥamās and the Lebanese Maronite 
Church have announced plans to set up the equivalent of media cities [Kraidy and Khalil 2009: 135].
Media cities have been perceived as ‘oases of media freedom’ [Krzysiek 2009: 79].  However, 
Krzysiek [2009: 79] believes that ‘numerous incidents related to ‘inappropriate’ media practices force 
18)  In Oman, Halley Media Production (HMP) started in 1986 [Homepage of HMP].  In Jordan, something equiva-
lent to a media city was started in 1978 as a semi-government sector [Sullivan 2001b].  However, those entities 
are different from contemporary media cities that are generally characterized by attractive advantages for private 
media companies.
19)  Guaaybess [2008: 208] also mentions a media city in Tangiers, Morocco.
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us to question freedom of speech within these ‘media oases.’’  Even in DMC, the most advanced 
media city in the Arab world, two of Pakistan’s leading private television channels were forced to 
shut down after being ordered to stop transmitting via the UAE, probably for political reasons [Gulf 
News, November 13, 2007].  This suggests the necessity of considering the media city not only as 
a form of media democratization, but also as a way for cunning authoritarian regimes to meet the 
challenges of globalization and the global economy [Krzysiek 2009: 69].  However, the media city 
still positions itself as an alternative harbor for freedom of speech and an essential component of the 
contemporary Arab media scene.
4.2 The Characteristics of Media Cities
We can discern the development of media cities by focusing on three cases: Egypt, Jordan, and the 
UAE, 20) the countries that spearheaded the media city trend.  In order to clarify how they developed 
and analyze their characteristics, we will consider each of them briefl y, with a focus on issues such as 
ownership, purpose, and recent developments.
4.2.1 The Case of Egypt
Envisioned as the ‘Hollywood of the Middle East,’ Egyptian Media Production City (EMPC) was 
inaugurated in 1997 [Kandil 2000].  EMPC is located in Sixth of October City, 10 km from the 
pyramids of Giza and 20 km from central Cairo.  Initially, it boasted a huge area of two million 
square meters containing three complexes housing 29 studios equipped with up-to-date facilities, 
expansive outdoor shooting areas, theatres, and other necessary facilities [Kandil 2000].  The area 
and facilities multiplied rapidly and, as of January 2011, reached over four million square meters 
with six complexes housing 70 studios and an academy for media science and engineering. 21)  The 
city is the largest in the Arab world.
The purpose behind EMPC was strongly refl ected in the remarks of Ṣafwat Sharīf, the former 
Egyptian Minister of Information: ‘Egypt wants to continue leading in information, in media, and 
Arabic production’ [Forrester 2001].  It is evident that, through EMPC, the Egyptian government 
wants to showcase Egypt as the Arab world’s most prominent fi lm and broadcasting centre.  Strictly 
speaking, EMPC is nominally a semi-government organization and some private banks have joined 
EMPC’s Council of Trustees as shareholders (see Table 2).  However, the Egyptian government 
maintains direct control through the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), the national 
broadcasting union under the Ministry of Information that closely interacts with banks and 
20)  In addition to these three countries, Oman also set up Halley Media Production (HMP).  However, the nature and 
role of HMP are still not clear, and there are few studies on it.
21)  Interview with a staff member of EMPC (January 23, 2011).
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companies.
In 2000, in order to help EMPC and extend tax benefi ts to more media companies, Egypt 
Media Free Zone (EMFZ) was created in the area between EMPC and Nilesat’s earth station [Kandil 
2000].  Although national channels use some of EMPC’s and EMFZ’s facilities and studios, they are 
mainly assigned for private channels. 22)  The distinction between national channels and private chan-
nels is comparatively clear.  A number of private satellite television and radio channels have located 
their stations within these special zones.
However, the case of Dream TV indicates that the government still wants to interfere with the 
media.  In 2002, Egypt’s free-zone authority suggested that Dream TV might lose its broadcasting 
license after it had broadcast programs both sexually explicit and critical of local government.  Many 
suspected that this warning was a direct result of a political comment made during a program [Sakr 
2007: 198].  Moreover, amid the turmoil of the 2011 protest movement, regardless of its location 
within EMPC, Egypt’s Information Minister Anas al-Fiqqī suspended al-Jazeera’s operations, 
cancelled its license, and withdrew accreditation from its staff [al-Jazeera Net, January 30, 2011]. 
These events all happened suddenly and were big news; they were enough to mar EMPC’s image. 23)
4.2.2 The Case of Jordan
Jordan was the fi rst Arab country to develop the concept of a media city.  The predecessor of the 
current media city was built in 1978 and began operating in 1982 as a semi-government entity. 
However, due to a fi nancial crisis, the venture collapsed in 1991 and its facilities were not used again 
22)  Interview with a staff member of EMPC (January 23, 2011).
23)  After the revolution in February, 2011, Anas al-Fiqqī and former state broadcasting chief Osama al-Sheikh were 
both arrested from their homes [al-Jazeera Net, February 24, 2011].  So, the situation has been dramatically 
changing.
Table 2.  Capital Structure of the EMPC
Shareholder Country-link Share
Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) Egypt 50%
National Investment Bank Egypt 14%
National Commercial Bank Egypt  5%
Bank of Cairo Egypt  5%
Bank of Alexandria Egypt  5%
Misr Insurance Company Egypt  5%
Egyptian Company for Investment Projects Egypt  5%
Egyptian Reinsurance Company Egypt  1%
Public-held Stock Egypt 10%
Source: Wizāra al-I‘lām Jumhūrīya Miṣr al-‘Arabīya [2000: 257]
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until 2001 [Sullivan 2001a].  The present Jordan Media City (JMC) was established as a private free 
zone by the Saudi Dallah Media Production Company, owned by media tycoon Ṣāliḥ Kāmil, with the 
help of Jordan’s Information Communication Technology (ICT) program [Krzysiek 2009: 69].  JMC 
is located east of Amman and near Queen Alia International Airport.  Dallah Media Production 
Company bought the main building from Jordan Production Company, the predecessor of the 
current JMC, and rented the land measuring 40,000 square meters from the Jordanian government. 
According to an interview with JMC staff, the number of satellite channels that contract with JMC 
has reached around 250, and except for the pass-through channels, 24) the number of channels that 
JMC is in contract with for transmission is around 60 (as of the end of November 2011). 25)  Those 
60 channels include playout channels, fi ber channels, internet channels, and radio channels.  Because 
JMC’s maximum playout capacity has been reached, the company recently upgraded its playout cen-
ter to 90 channels [Homepage of JMC].  JMC took its building and equipment over from an earlier 
company and updated the facilities.  The set-up cost was 10 million JD (15 million USD) [Homepage 
of JMC].
Although JMC is a private media city, the project, like other media cities, resulted from govern-
ment policy.  In an examination of the three media cities in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, Quinn et 
al. [2004: 5] point out that they share two common goals: ‘to generate income and create jobs for the 
teaming masses in the Arab world who must fi nd work.’  King Abdullah of Jordan has always given 
his full support to JMC.  Behind his support, of course, is the clear expectation that JMC will gener-
ate jobs and propel the national economy through knowledge-based industries.  It is true that, on 
one hand, there were strong economic reasons for Ṣāliḥ Kāmil to construct JMC in order to reduce 
the operational costs of his ART channel (by moving from Italy to Amman).  However, on the other 
hand, the strong support of the king and the Jordanian government suggests that Jordan regards 
JMC as an important means of making itself the media hub of the region and an important symbol 
of modernity.  The fact that Raḍī al-Khas, former director general of the Jordan Radio and Television 
Corporation, has been JMC’s CEO indicates the strong relationship between JMC and the Jordanian 
government. 26)
24)  A pass-through channel is a channel that utilizes JMC only as a connecting point from one broadcasting satellite to 
another.
25)  In 2004, only 16 satellite channels transmitted from the JMC [Jordan Times, September 10, 2004].  Further, the 
type of channels that JMC contracts with can be classifi ed into four categories: playout channel, fi ber channel, 
Internet channel, and pass-through channel.
26)  Article in [Jordan Media Institute].
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4.2.3 The Case of Dubai and the UAE
Media cities in the UAE are the projects of each emirate.  Four of the seven emirates have their own 
media cities, 27) with Dubai having the largest.  Like Egypt and Jordan, each emirate aims to be 
a regional and global information hub and aims to use its media city to create synergies between 
media and other economic activities.  In the Arab world, Dubai leads the media city trend with four 
of them: Dubai Media City (DMC), Dubai Studio City (DSC), Dubai Internet City (DIC), and the 
International Media Production Zone (IMPZ).  IMPZ had not yet been completed as of November 
2011, but the other three media cities have attracted much investor interest and consequently huge 
investments.  In the realm of broadcast media, DMC has been in the spotlight.
DMC was inaugurated in 2001, requiring an estimated 800 million USD for set-up expenses. 
In the set-up period, DMC boasted of two million square meters and many skyscrapers; both the 
size and number of the buildings is still expanding.  DMC was constructed to help the UAE become 
a regional and global media hub.  To this end, it developed several media activities: marketing, 
broadcasting, new media, publishing, music, fi lm, and events services [Homepage of DMC].  DMC 
stands out among other media cities and has attracted many investors with its up-to-date facilities, 
attractive location, and capacity to offer skilled technicians.  As manifested on its homepage, DMC’s 
success refl ects the support of Sheikh Muḥammad bin Rāshid al-Maktūm, Prime Minister and Ruler 
of Dubai, who wishes to transform Dubai into a knowledge-based society and economy [Homepage 
of DMC].
The expansion of DMC has been remarkable.  Since its launch, the number of the companies 
that operate in the territory of DMC increased from 880 in 2004 to over 1,200 in 2008.  By 2009, 
60 satcasters were operating nearly 150 channels from DMC [Kraidy and Khalil 2009: 135-136]. 
Under the umbrella of TECOM Investments, 28) DMC enjoys interactivity with DIC, DSC, IMPZ, 
and other free zones such as Knowledge Village, inaugurated in 2003.  Unlike Egypt and Jordan, the 
UAE can offer a multinational workforce from countries outside the Arab world, such as India.  In 
addition to Arab media companies, international companies from India, Europe, and the USA have 
also established regional bureaus here [TECOM Directory 2011].
There have been several incidents where freedom of expression has been betrayed.  For example, 
in November 2007, DMC blocked the satellite signals of two popular Pakistani news channels, Geo 
27)  In Dubai, there are four media cities, and Ras al-Khaimah has Ras al-Khaimah Media City (RAK Media City). 
Fujairah has Fujairah Creative City (FCC), and Abu Dhabi has Twofour54.
28)  The TECOM (The Dubai Free Zone for Technology, e-Commerce and Media) is a national project that aims to 
construct industrial privileged areas to promote the ICT (Information and Communication Technology) policy.
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and ARY, accusing them of interfering with the politics of Pakistan.  Although those two channels 
were allowed to resume broadcasting soon after they promised to abide by TECOM regulations, 
they announced that they were considering moving their bases out of Dubai [Gulf News, November 
25, 2007].  In addition to this direct interference, el-Baltaji [2007: 5] points out that ‘the govern-
ment’s involvement in the regulation of the media has driven a number of journalists to exercise 
self-censorship, which, in the region’s and possibly the world’s largest media hub, degrades the 
journalistic integrity of those writing and publishing articles in Dubai.’
4.3 Strategy of Differentiation
After comparing media cities in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, Quinn et al. [2004: 13-14] conclude 
that ‘these cities are competing in a tiny marketplace….  In the end, as Darwin has said, it is not the 
strongest or the most intelligent species that survives.  It is the one that is most responsive to change.’ 
However, the media market of the Arab world has been expanding more rapidly than expected, and 
the growth of satellite channels had spurred the construction of media cities throughout the Arab 
world.  Competitions occurring in the sky and on the ground have joined hand in hand, producing 
a situation very different from their observation that only fl exible media cities can survive.  Rather, 
as Sakr [2007: 195] argues, ‘any real competition among them might be expected to promote a 
decentralization of decision-making, with companies choosing between locations based on factors 
such as bureaucracy, property prices, labor costs and availability of skills.’ While it is diffi cult to 
determine which factor a media company considers most important when choosing its location, it is 
possible to identify each media city’s most appealing advantage.  We will therefore now consider the 
strategies by which each media city competes with the others.
According to Hamdy [2002], EMPC’s tenants all share something in common: they are mainly 
private Egyptian channels and the bureaus of regional satellite channels.  Taking a random sample of 
some of the channels with EMPC studios (see Table 3), reveals the validity of Hamdy’s observation. 
Many infl uential Egyptian satellite channels, such as Dream TV, Melody Entertainment, Mazzika 
Group, and al-Miḥwar actually broadcast from EMPC.  Meanwhile, the rest of the channels include 
some infl uential regional media companies, such as the al-Baghdādīya Channel, al-Nās TV, and the 
MBC channel, and they lease studios from EMPC as their main or branch broadcasting center.
This tendency is also implied in the remarks of Ṣafwat Sharīf.  In an interview, Sharīf said, ‘the 
Egyptian media are not for sale.  I’m not in favor of privatizing the media, nor of selling the tools 
that shape the Egyptian mind and protect it against the challenges facing our developing country’ 
[Berenger and Labidi 2005: 87].  Even though the tone changed after his successors emphasized the 
privatization of Egyptian media more than his predecessors did, this tendency still continues.  Thus, 
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the EMPC tends to offer its space to infl uential private Egyptian channels and some regional media 
companies.
Compared with EMPC, JMC is likely to attract comparatively newer channels.  Except for the 
channels under the ART network’s umbrella, most tenants are relatively newcomers and relatively 
unknown media channels [Chiba 2012b].  All the beginning, the JMC lagged behind the media cities 
in Egypt and the UAE in its infrastructure.  During its set-up period, JMC refurbished its equipment, 
but it is still less impressive than that of DMC [Quinn et al. 2004: 8].  However, in a remark from 
Raḍī al-Khas, CEO of JMC, we fi nd that JMC’s strategy is different from that of DMC:
Jordan is different from Dubai.  As far as regulation and tax free status, we are ready to 
compete aggressively with Dubai….Dubai, as everyone knows, is all about real estate—high-
rise apartments and offi ces and quite spectacular development.  This is not so in Jordan.  We are 
sophisticated in a different way….We have plenty of channels which have moved from Dubai to us 
here in Jordan.  Dubai is expensive, infl ation is rising fast, communications in terms of traffi c is a 
nightmare and people are realizing that Amman has a great deal to offer. 29)
This remark makes it clear that al-Khas wants to differentiate JMC from DMC.  Unlike DMC, JMC 
is reasonably priced while offering comparatively skilled engineers and technicians.  Unlike EMPC, 
JMC is more open to foreign companies and is willing to invite them.  Thus, JMC’s strategy is to 
29)  Article in [The IBC Daily].
Table 3.  Selected Broadcasting Channels in EMPC
Channel Medium Country-Link Ownership
Dream TV TV Egypt Private
Melody Entertainment TV Egypt Private
Mazzika Group TV Egypt Private
Nogoum FM Radio Egypt Private
al-Miḥwar Channel TV Egypt Private
al-Baghdādīya Channel TV Iraq Private
al-Nās TV TV Saudi Private
MBC Channel TV Saudi Private
O TV TV Egypt Private
Modern TV Egypt TV Egypt Private
Qīthāra Channel TV Iraq Private
al-Raḥma TV TV Egypt Private
Sources: Interview with a staff of EMPC (January 23, 2011), Several Websites.
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offer a comparatively attractive location to media companies that are still not famous, but wish to 
position themselves to challenge the regional media market.  Many of the companies in JMC are 
blessed with comparatively low costs and have comparatively highly skilled staff and quality equip-
ment.
This differentiation in media strategy applies, of course, to DMC.  According to Sa‘īd al-
Muntafi q, former CEO of DMC, its recent success fl ows from the recognition that Dubai is different 
from other Arab countries:
We’re not Lebanon, we’re not Egypt, and we know what our strengths are and what our 
weaknesses are.  Our focus…is primarily in the digital sense.  We have the best technology 
infrastructure in the region here in the free zone.  Our closeness to Dubai Internet City helps us 
to achieve that—the whole city is wired with fi ber optic links.  So in terms of creating content 
digitally, manipulating it digitally, post-producing it digitally, that’s really where our focus is [al-
Muntafi q 2001].
His statement indicates that DMC’s strategy is not to boast of its huge area or its reasonable costs but 
rather its advanced infrastructure and synergies between media and other activities (such as econom-
ics and academia).  In an interview, Zafar Siddiqi, CEO and Chairman of Middle East Business 
News (MEBN), gives two reasons why they put their headquarters in DMC.  First, he emphasizes 
the unrestricted freedom of speech.  Second, he emphasizes the importance of Dubai itself, saying 
that Dubai has become ‘the focal point for most multinational companies operating out of this area, 
and that helps us [media companies] to get more interviews because more CEOs and chairmen are 
stopping over in Dubai’ [Siddiqi 2001].
Al-Muntafi q [2001] points out that DMC’s vision is ‘not to be a regional base for broadcasters, 
but to be one of four or fi ve global bases for broadcasting.’  Obviously, the strategy of DMC is not 
directed only to local and regional media companies but also to regional and even global media 
companies.  Through the statements of media companies moving to DMC, we discover that DMC’s 
vision is shared by the media companies located there.  The manifest vision of the MBC (Middle East 
Broadcasting Center) refl ects this tendency well: ‘with our heart in the Arab world, we are forging 
a global media group that enriches people’s lives through information, interaction and entertain-
ment.’ 30)  In this statement, we see that the MBC is not targeting only Arab viewers but is aiming for 
30)  ‘Mission and Vision’ in homepage of [MBC Group].
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global audiences.
4.4 Competition or Complementation?
As is evident, competition among Arab media cities does not always occur on only one level.  Media 
cities do not always compete to attract clients who want to eat the same pie.  Each media city tries 
to differentiate itself, conscious of its strengths and weaknesses.  Therefore, it is not accurate to say 
that each contemporary Arab media city is merely a clone of the others, existing just to compete.  In 
fact, through a strategy of differentiation, each media city targets different clients even when the 
differences are slight and overlapping.  Generally speaking, media cities mirror the countries they 
are in: the geographical, social, political, and economic situations of each country are refl ected in the 
characteristics of the respective media cities it contains.  In addition, the media companies’ choice 
of location refl ects the characteristics of those media cities and is a reaction to the strategies of those 
media cities.  This ultimately results in the diversifi cation of the companies’ locations.
The differences among media cities provide media companies with multiple options.  The 
location of media cities offer media companies the opportunity to expand their regional and global 
presence.  In the development and recent multiplicity of the Arab media scene, media cities have 
played a key sustaining and promotional role.  Therefore, it is true that the media cities compete and 
complement each other.  The differences among media cities create the basis for the multiplicity and 
diversity of contemporary satellite channels, which, in turn, contribute to the growth of these cities.
5. Conclusion
This article attempts to reveal the geographical transformation of Arab media and to understand 
contemporary Arab media dynamics with a focus on the satellite channel and the media city by tak-
ing two ‘harbors for freedom of speech,’ Europe and media cities, as the objects of study.  After the 
1970s, many Arab media publishers, initially operating in Europe, became infl uential actors in the 
Arab media scene.  Beginning in the 1990s, satellite channels emerged, with most of the infl uential 
private ones headquartering in Europe.  Therefore, Europe became known as a harbor for freedom 
of speech.  These media with headquarters outside of the Arab world, mainly in Europe, are referred 
to as ‘offshore media.’  The offshore media phenomenon and its consequence, the geographical 
division of Arab media discourses between the Arab world and Europe were regarded as essential 
characteristics of Arab media.
However, this article has revealed that the development and proliferation of satellite television 
spurred competition in the Arab media industry and this competition promoted the return of 
Europe-based Arab media companies, particularly satellite channels, to Arab countries and dis-
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solved this geographical division.  Now, most of the pivotal Arab satellite channels broadcast not 
from Europe but from inside of the Arab world and the presence of offshore media has declined. 
Importantly, in accommodating these previously Europe-based media channels (and a number of 
newcomers), something called the ‘media city’ has played an important role.  Media city is regarded 
as the new harbor for freedom of speech, an alternative to the role previously played by Europe. 
Many key private channels have located their headquarters and bureaus in Arab media cities, which 
work hard to be attractive locations.  Because the media city is so crucial to the contemporary Arab 
media scene, this article has revealed how each one developed and how they relate to one another.
Most of the pioneering studies on media cities tend to discuss each media city separately or 
have compared their legal and economic aspects.  Moreover, those studies do not inquire into the 
relationships between one media city and the other media cities.  To solve these problems, this 
article examines their inter-relationships, and reveals that contemporary media cities have differing 
roles that are complementary to one another.  Media cities tend to refl ect the local situations in 
their respective locations, and they each have different advantages and demerits.  Therefore, the 
administration of each media city targets different clients.  This gives multiple-choices to media 
companies, which have different goals and visions and chose their location according to the features 
of each media city.  Thus, media cities contribute to the diversity of the contemporary Arab media 
scene.  In other words, with the development of media cities, small and medium sized private media 
companies and international media companies, all of which had diffi culties entering the Arab media 
market before, can now enter the Arab broadcasting arena easily, thus bringing diversity to the 
contemporary Arab broadcasting scene.  Ultimately, it is reasonable to say that media cities function 
not only as new harbors of freedom of speech but also as devices for the promotion of the diversity of 
contemporary Arab media.
Under the auspices of Arab governments, the number of media cities is likely to increase during 
the next decade, and with its expanding international infl uence, the development of the media city 
can be discussed as an aspect of globalization.  Therefore, while this informational transformation is 
related to the political and social affairs in Arab societies, the phenomena of the media city and the 
transformation of contemporary Arab media should be understood by comparison with other case 
studies worldwide, and be located in the transformation of global communication.  It goes without 
saying that further examination is necessary for assessing the impact and signifi cance of the media 
cities.
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